On January 28, attackers stole more than $80 million from Binance Smart Chain-based Qubit Finance.
Qubit Finance announced this attack on its official Twitter.
The protocol was exploited by;
— Qubit Finance (@QubitFin) January 28, 2022
0xd01ae1a708614948b2b5e0b7ab5be6afa01325c7
The hacker minted unlimited xETH to borrow on BSC.
The team is currently working with security and network partners on next steps.
We will share further updates when available.
Addresses connected with the attack indicate that 206,809 BNB were stolen from Qubit’s QBridge protocol. According to security firm PeckShield, the stolen assets are worth more than $80 million.
It seems the QBridge of @QubitFin is hacked to mint huge amount of xETH collateral and drain the pool funds about $80M. Please note we audited the Qubit lending, not the QBridge! More to come...
— PeckShield Inc. (@peckshield) January 27, 2022
Incident Timeline
- Jan-27–2022 09:18:55 PM +UTC: 0.8887725 ETH sent from tornado to attacker account
- Jan-27–2022 09:34:01 PM +UTC~Jan-27–2022 09:50:41 PM +UTC: Sent 16 deposit tx to QBridge of Ethereum
- Jan-27–2022 09:36:32 PM +UTC~Jan-27–2022 09:51:02 PM +UTC: Sent 16 voteProposal tx to QBridge contract of BSC by Qubit Relayer
- A number of xETH tokens were minted by 16 voteProposal tx, and liquidity in Qubit was withdrawn using this as collateral
Exploit Method
The attacker called the QBridge deposit function on the ethereum network, which calls the deposit function QBridgeHandler.
QBridgeHandler should receive the WETH token, which is the original tokenAddress, and if the person who performed the tx does not have a WETH token, the transfer should not occur.
tokenAddress.safeTransferFrom(depositer, address(this), amount);
In the code above, tokenAddress is 0, so safeTransferFrom didn’t fail and the deposit function ended normally regardless of the amount value.
Additionally, tokenAddress was the WETH address before depositETH was added, but as depositETH is added, it is replaced with the zero address that is the tokenAddress of ETH.
In summary, the deposit function was a function that should not be used after depositETH was newly developed, but it remained in the contract.
Actions taken
- The team is continuing to track the exploiter and monitor affected assets.
- The team has contacted the exploiter to offer the maximum bounty as set by our program.
- The team is cooperating with security and network partners, including Binance.
- Supply, Redeem, Borrow, Repay, Bridge, and Bridge redemption functions are disabled until further notice. Claiming is available.
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